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The Effects of Discrimination in Public Goods Games
Introduction
This study explores the effects of
discrimination on people’s willingness to
contribute to public goods. The experiment
not only attempts to measure the
significance of this partiality, but also
attempts to shed light on how discrimination
affects this willingness to contribute by
testing both the feeling of discrimination and
the possibility that discrimination leads to
lower payouts. Beyond this, the study acts
as an opportunity to further connect the
thoughts, behaviors, and political tendencies
of social groups to their fiscal decisions.
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Figure 1.
Participants per Treatment Group

Difference in tokens from Control Group’s
average:
– Treatment 1: 0.961 (0.904)
– Treatment 2a 2.916*** (0.952)
– Treatment 2b 1.883** (0.964)
Treatment 2a has highest average contribution
despite being most disadvantaged

Average Contributions by Round
•
•

Figure 2.
Average Contributions

Literature Review

Contributions began modest and overall
decreased as rounds progressed
Treatment 2a consistently contributed the
most of all treatments by round also
** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
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Discussion

Average Contributions
out of 25 tokens

Total Participants: 118
25

• Focus of prior research:
– Proving the “Free Rider” effect
– Analyzing effects of demographic differences such
as gender, ethnicity, and income level
– Analyzing effects of psychological differences such
as altruism and decision error
• Recent experimental design shifts
– Accounting for heterogeneity of groups
– Accounting for group connectedness/altruism
– Reworking design to minimize decision error and
miscomprehension
• Further improvements for my study
– Reworking design to minimize miscomprehension of
instructions and game play
– Careful consideration of treatment randomization for
statistical significance
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Figure 3.
Average Contributions by Round
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Private Optimum
• Maximize individual payout -> Individual keeps all
25 of their tokens each round while other group
members contribute all of their 25 tokens
• 0+25+25 tokens/group * = 50 * 1.5 multiplier
– 100 token payout/group
– Player 1: 50 tokens
– Player 2: 25 tokens
– Player 3: 25 tokens
• Leads to “Free Rider” problem = No contributions

Perhaps disadvantaged participants sought to
overcome their discrimination by over-compensating
in contributions, i.e. income effect
Otherwise, could be an effect of altruism or
confusion, though the latter is unlikely based on
experimental design

Room for Further Study
•

Social Optimum
• Maximize group payout -> Everyone contributes all
25 of their tokens each round
• 25 tokens * 3 people/group = 75* 1.5 multiplier
– 112.5 token payout/group
– 37.5 token payout/person

Expectation met: contributions decreased over the
course of the game
Expectation met: contributions were more consistent
with the private optimum than the social optimum
Expectation challenged: most discriminated group
produced the highest contributions per round and
overall throughout the game

Potential Reasoning

Treatment

Methodology
• Participants: 120 University of Rhode Island students
• Treatments
– Control Group: knowledge of their contribution payout structure
and no knowledge of any discriminatory conditions of the other
players
– Treatment Group 1: identified as a disadvantaged group but
with no change in its payouts
– Treatment Group 2: learns that they have been assigned to a
disadvantaged population and are made aware of exactly how
disproportionate their payout structure is as compared to the
other members of their group
• Game Parameters
– Public good to fund: public school
– Groups of 3
– Rounds of contribution collection: 5
– Tokens given per round: 25
– Payout structure: (See Table 1)

Results

Table 1.
Treatment Payout Structures

Explore variation of discrimination's psychological
connotations -> economic interpretations for
contributions to public goods rather than assign
general sense of “disadvantage” to a test group
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